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This passage divides all change into three categories: (1) change from something underlying to something underlying, (2) change from something underlying to something not underlying, and (3) change not from something underlying to something underlying.
A fourth possibility (change not from something underlying to something not underlying) is eliminated as spurious because 'in that case there is no opposition either of contraries or of contradictories'. Later on, (1) is given, and (2) and (3) are denied the label 'motion'. The result is that (1) is both a change and a motion since, as is implied throughout the passage above, motion is a type of change (cf. 225a34), while (2) and (3), which are also called 'ceasing to be' and 'coming to be' respectively, are merely changes.
The general point of this passage is clear: While motion proceeds between contraries, change that is not motion is a change between contradictories. What is not clear is what Aristotle means by 'something underlying' (ὑποκείµενον). Bonitz thinks it
is 'that which is posited as the substratum in which something else inheres'. 4 Ross claims that since the changes in this passage are said to proceed to and from 'something underlying', it must be a terminus and not a substratum. It must be 'a positive entity (a6-7)-a substantial nature, a quality, a size, or a place-which has to be laid down or presupposed as implied in change, viz. as its terminus a quo or ad quem.' 5 Ross refers to lines 225a6-7, which says 'by "something underlying" I mean what is expressed by an affirmation' (τὸ καταφάσει δηλούµενον). But he clearly also has in mind 225b3-5, which says that in a change from something underlying to something underlying, what underlies 'is either a contrary or an intermediate (for a privation may be allowed to rank as a contrary) and can be expressed by an affirmation, as naked, toothless, or black', and this seems to suggest that being expressed by an affirmation (δηλοῦται καταφάσει) involves being designated by a positive term.
But glossing ὑποκείµενον as 'positive entity' papers over a problem, because but 'names and verbs by themselves-for instance "man" or "white" when nothing further is added--are like the thoughts that are without combination and separation; for so far they are neither true nor false' (16a10-18). A noun is a name of a subject, a verb is 'a sign of what holds of a subject', and when combined they either affirm or deny 'something of something' (τὶ κατὰ τινὸς, De Int. 10, 19b5, cf. De Int. 6, 17a25-6; An Post.
1.2, 72a13-4), e.g., not simply man or white but that a man is white. So it appears that what is primarily expressed by an affirmation is neither an attribute, as Ross suggests, nor a subject of an attribute, as Bonitz suggests, but that an attribute holds of a subject.
In his discussion of truth and falsity in Metaphysics Θ 10, Aristotle makes it clear that combinations of linguistic entities in an affirmation are matched, in the case of a true affirmation, by combinations of non-linguistic entities in their truth-makers, or 'objects' (πράγµατα), as Aristotle calls them. 'The condition of [truth and falsity] in the objects is 4 their being combined or separated, so that he who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose thought is in a state contrary to that of the objects is in error' (1051b2-5). According to Aristotle, it is 'your being white' (τὸ σὲ εἶναι λευκὸν), or more precisely, the combination of you and pallor in the object of the affirmation that you are white that makes this affirmation true. And corresponding to the distinction between significant utterances (φάσεις) and affirmations (καταφάσεις) in language is a distinction between incomposite and composite objects (1051b24-5). A composite object is a combination of a subject and an attribute, e.g., man
and pallor, while an incomposite object is, e.g., a form or immaterial substance. And while one can only signify (φάναι) or fail to signify the simple form of, e.g., man, one can affirm (καταφάναι) or deny (ἀποφάναι) the combination of the composite object 'your being white'. Aristotle says that for a composite object to be is to be 'combined and one', and for it not to be is to be 'separated and many'. For the object denoted by 'τὸ σὲ εἶναι λευκὸν' (1051b8) to be is for you to be combined in the appropriate way with pallor. For it not to be is for you to be separated from pallor. The modern name for this composite object or πρᾶγµα, which Aristotle also denotes with an articular infinitive with an (often implied) accusative subject, e.g., 'your being white' (τὸ σὲ εἶναι λευκὸν), is 'state of affairs'. I suggest that the existence of a state of affairs is what is expressed by an affirmation.
And as it happens, Aristotle says that a state of affairs underlies an affirmation in Categories 10, which would seem to give us something which underlies that is also expressed by an affirmation:
Nor is what underlies an affirmation and denial (τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν) itself an affirmation or denial. For an affirmation is an affirmative statement and a denial a negative statement, whereas none of the things underlying an affirmation or denial (τῶν δὲ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ ἀπόφασιν) is a 5 statement. These are, however, said to be opposed to one another as affirmation and denial are; for in these cases, too, the manner of opposition is the same. For in the way an affirmation is opposed to a denial, for example 'he is sitting'-'he is not sitting' (τὸ κάθηται -οὐ κάθηται), so are opposed also the objects underlying each (τὸ ὑφ᾿ ἑκάτερον πρᾶγµα), his sitting-his not sitting (τὸ καθῆσθαι -µὴ καθῆσθαι). (Cat. 10, 12b6-16) What underlies the affirmation 'he is sitting' as its truth-maker is the state of affairs referred to by the phrase 'his sitting'. My suggestion is that the ὑποκείµενον referred to in Physics 5.1 that is expressed by an affirmation is the state of affairs that underlies an affirmation as a truth maker. 6 Aristotle twice tells us in where he says that a πρᾶγµα is false if 'it is not combined or it is impossible for it to be combined'. Assuming that by πρᾶγµα Aristotle means 'state of affairs', it would seem to follow that if there were negative states of affairs, then Aristotle would have also said that a negative πρᾶγµα could be false if it were not divided. 8 But he does not, and so, according to Crivelli, he must not countenance negative states of affairs. The problem with these conclusions, I think, is that they are never explicitly avowed by Aristotle, Another issue worth mentioning, but one which counts neither for nor against my interpretation, is the question of whether states of affairs, in addition to existing or not existing, also obtain or do not obtain, with the implication that non-obtaining states of affairs have some existence as a mental or abstract object. Aristotle does, for instance, talk at Metaphysics Δ 29, 1024b17-21 of false states of affairs (again called πράγµατα and referred to with articular infinitives with accusative subjects) as either not combined or unable to be combined, and this would seem to suggest that states of affairs are bivalent.
Given my interpretation of the immediately preceding passage, the most pressing issue is whether the examples, here, can be plausibly interpreted to refer to states of affairs. The phrase '[change] from not white to white' (ἡ µὲν ἐκ µὴ λευκοῦ εἰς λευκόν) in lines [14] [15] would seem to refer to just the qualities white and not white. Now of course, Aristotle would agree that every change from not white to white is also a change from something not being white to something being white because attributes cannot exist on their own.
The question is whether Aristotle means to single out attributes as what comes to be in a qualified coming to be, and this depends on whether τούτου in line 15 refers to λευκόν.
Taken on its own it certainly seems to, and the result is that this passage seems to say that qualified coming to be is, e.g., coming to be of white. But a passage in Generation and Corruption 1.3 that also mentions qualified coming to be casts doubt on this assumption.
There, Aristotle says, 'Qualified coming to be is from not being something, e.g. from not white or not beautiful, whereas coming to be simpliciter is from not being simpliciter.' 10 Here, the terminus a quo of qualified coming to be is "not being something" (µὴ ὄντος τινός), e.g., 'not being white' instead of just 'not white', so in this passage 'not white' and 'not beautiful' are short for 'not being white' and 'not being beautiful'. This leads me to believe that 'white' and 'not white' are also short for 'being white' and 'not being white'
at Physics 5.1, 225a14-15.
I say 'not being white' (ἐκ µὴ [ὄντος] λευκοῦ) instead of 'being not white' (ἐκ
[ὄντος] µὴ λευκοῦ) since this is the word order at Generation and Corruption 1.3, 317b3-5, and because the expression must be a denial that opposes 'being white' as a contradictory (225a11-12). In Prior Analytics 1.46, Aristotle says that while 'to not be white' (τὸ µὴ εἶναι λευκόν) is a denial, 'to be not-white' (τὸ εἶναι µὴ λευκόν) is an affirmation, albeit of a negative property.
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So if, in general, the terminus a quo of qualified coming to be is 'not being something', then we should also take 'from not white to white' in 225a14-5 (ἐκ µὴ λευκοῦ εἰς λευκὸν) to be short for 'from not being white to being white' (ἐκ µὴ [ὄντος] 10 λευκοῦ εἰς [οὐσίαν] λευκόν). If this is the case, then the reference of τούτου in line 15 is 'being white' rather than just 'white'. So a qualified coming to be is the coming to be of τὸ ὄν τι from τὸ µὴ ὄν τι which can be more plausibly interpreted as a change between states of affairs. This is because the participles can be read as substantives (e.g., as
'something being something' or 'something not being something'), and since Aristotle evidently takes τὸ µὴ εἶναι (225a18) and τὸ µὴ ὂν (225a15) to be equivalent expressions, we can assimilate both τὸ µὴ ὂν ἁπλῶς and τὸ µὴ ὄν τι to the negative state of affairs τὸ µὴ καθῆσθαι [τινα] underlying a denial in Categories 10. And the contradictories of these, viz., τὸ ὂν ἁπλῶς and τὸ ὄν τι are the things that underlie an affirmation and do not underlie a corresponding denial. So τὸ µὴ ὂν ἁπλῶς and τὸ µὴ ὄν τι are the termini a quo and τὸ ὂν ἁπλῶς and τὸ ὄν τι are the termini ad quem, respectively, of changes from something not underlying to something underlying.
225a20-34:
Now things are said not to be in several ways; and there can be motion neither of that which is not in respect of combination or separation, nor of that which is not in the sense that it only potentially is, that is to say the opposite of that which actually is simpliciter; for although that which is not white or not good may nevertheless be in motion accidentally (for example that which is not white might be a man), yet that which is simpliciter not a 'this' cannot in any sense be in motion. Therefore, it is impossible for that which is not to be in motion. This being so, it follows that becoming cannot be a motion; for it is that which is not that becomes. For however true it may be that it accidentally becomes, it is nevertheless correct to say that it is that which is not that becomes simpliciter.
And similarly it is impossible for that which is not to be at rest. There are these difficulties, then, [in the way of the assumption that that which is not can be in 11 motion], and it may be further objected that, whereas everything which is in motion is in place, that which is not is not in place; for then it would be somewhere. So, too, perishing is not a motion; for a motion has for its contrary either another motion or rest, whereas perishing is the contrary of becoming.
(225a20-34)
Things are said not to be in several ways.
Aristotle begins this section of the text by considering two senses of something not existing (τὸ µὴ ὂν):
12 (1) something not existing as a combination or separation (τὸ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἢ διαίρεσιν) and (2) something not existing as a 'this' and actually simpliciter, but existing potentially. The ensuing argument, that takes up the rest of the chapter, establishes the claim that no coming to be or ceasing to be simpliciter is a motion based on the assumption that all changes of these types start or end in the second of these states of not existing, and things that do not exist in this sense cannot undergo motion. Having eliminated these sorts of changes as motions, it is then inferred that only changes from something underlying to something underlying are motions. Simplicius, however, reads three senses of non-being at 225a20-25, distinguishing existing potentially and not actually simpliciter from not existing as a 'this', but I think the γάρ at 225a23 suggests that what follows is an elaboration on existing potentially and not actually simpliciter (Simplicius, In Phys. 815,24 ff.). Again, Generation and Corruption 1.3 is helpful, because there, Aristotle talks of 'that which is only potentially a "this" and existing, but neither a "this" nor existing simpliciter' (τὸ δυνάµει µόνον τόδε καὶ ὄν, ἁπλῶς δὲ µὴ τόδε µηδ' ὄν). This appears just to be τὸ µὴ ὄν ἁπλῶς that we encountered at 225a15-16.
Simplicius also takes the first sense to apply only to a statement or belief, and explains
the claim that what is not in this sense (i.e., false) does not change by the fact that it is through the πράγµατα changing that true and false come to belong to statements and 12 beliefs while they themselves do not change (cf. Cat. 5, 4a21-b13). This, I think, makes the mention of this sense of non-being curiously irrelevant, since we are unlikely to suppose that changes in beliefs and statements would fall under the present discussion.
Rather, I suggest that not existing as a combination or separation is the other sense of non-being just encountered in 225a12-19, viz., τὸ µὴ ὄν τι. According to Metaphysics Θ 10, falsity involves not only the combination and separation of thoughts and words in affirmations and denials but also combinations and separations of components of the πράγµατα that make these things true and false. Indeed, Metaphysics Δ 29 says that there is a sense in which a πρᾶγµα can be false, i.e., if 'it is not combined or it is impossible for it to be combined', which seems to be just τὸ µὴ ὄν τι, or a πρᾶγµα in which a subject and Whitaker thinks the answer is 'no' because, first, being is homonymous, and is not a single attribute to be combined with a single type of subject, and second, since Aristotle treats existential statements like 'a man is' as different and more basic than statements like 'a man walks' in De Interpretatione 10, the two cases cannot be semantically analogous. 13 If we find these objections persuasive, and I think we should, we seem to have two options for the semantics of positive and negative existential statements involving concrete particulars; that is, while these statements involve combinations of names and verbs and 'say something of something', either the combinations and Aristotle distinguishes the truth conditions of statements about composites and incomposites as follows:
As regards being in the sense of truth and not being in the sense of falsity, in one case there is truth if the subject and the attribute are really combined, and falsity if they are not combined; in the other case, if the object is existent it exists in a particular way, and if it does not exist in this way it does not exist at all; and truth means thinking these objects, and falsity does not exist, nor error, but only ignorance,-and not an ignorance which is like blindness; for blindness is akin to a treats the matter-form relation as analogous to the substance-accident relation, the most impressive and sustained example being the application of the privation-form-subject model in Physics 1.7 to both substantial and non-substantial coming to be. 15 These passages lead me to conclude that the πράγµατα underlying existential statements about material substances are form-matter composites rather than incomposites.
That which is not is not in a place.
Lines 225a31-32 might also make us doubt that there is a πρᾶγµα underlying the denial 'Socrates is not'. Aristotle uses the claim that τὸ µὴ ὄν ἁπλῶς is in no place and the claim that everything that moves is in a place to argue that things not existing simpliciter cannot be the subject of motion: 'Everything which is in motion is in place, that which is not (τὸ µὴ ὂν) is not in place; for then it would be somewhere' (225a31-32). And in
Generation and Corruption 1.3, Aristotle infers from the claim that what exists only
potentially is in no place to the claim that it does not exist at all:
Will that which is only potentially a 'this' (which only potentially is), while without qualification it is not a 'this' (i.e. is not), possess, e.g., any determinate size or quality or place? For if it possesses none, but all of them potentially, the 15 result is that a being, which is not a determinate being, is capable of separate existence; and in addition that coming-to-be proceeds out of nothing pre-existingthesis which, more than any other, preoccupied and alarmed the earliest philosophers. (GC 1.3, 317b26-31 , cf. 317b7-11, which infers from not being a substance to not having a place.)
So it looks like a change from not existing simpliciter (ἐκ τοῦ µὴ ὄντος ἁπλῶς) is a change ex nihilo (ἐκ µηδενός) as the 'earliest philosophers' feared, which would appear to be a change from no πρᾶγµα at all (instead of from a negative πρᾶγµα, as I have claimed). But I think it is not an exaggeration to say that the whole of Generation and Corruption 1.3 is given over to avoiding this conclusion, and we must look to it to avoid the present difficulty. Aristotle starts with the assumption that coming to be simpliciter must be 'from not existing simpliciter' (ἐκ τοῦ µὴ ὄντος ἁπλῶς), and then sets out to find an interpretation of not existing simpliciter that does not result in generation ex nihilo (317b5). His method is to work through a series of ἀπορίαι which seem to threaten coming to be ex nihilo, and though the general outline of his answer is clear, the precise answer to the question is uncertain because the discussion ends in an ἀπορία. Aristotle's characterization of things that simpiciter are not as 'simpliciter not a "this"' in Rather, what is not actually a substance is either not actually the sort of substance that is coming to be or it is not actually the particular substance that is coming to be. As another sort, or as another particular substance, it has attributes and is thus not nothing at all, it just does not have the attributes of what is coming to be. But if what simply is not is just another substance from which, as matter, another substance comes to be, it does not help us with our passage in Physics 5.1, because this other substance will obviously be in some place. So we must look to the next stage of the argument in Generation and Corruption 1.3. 17 Aristotle raises a doubt whether this understanding of what is not actually a substance (i.e., what is not actually the sort of substance that is coming to be or it is not actually the particular substance that is coming to be) is what is not simpliciter because it too appears to be a thing that is (319a29-33). Then an extremely brief and tentative final section canvasses the possibility that what is not actually a certain token or type of substance is only potentially a thing that is (319a33-b2). But this seems to run up against the horn of the last dilemma that says a potential substance with only potential attributes is nothing at all. The standard response to this is that what is not in this sense is prime matter, something which in itself is only potentially a thing that is, but which at any time is always informed (Philoponus, In GC 1.3, 63; Aquinas, In GC 1.3, 70). The problem with this, one might think, is that however much prime matter is in itself only potentially a thing that is, it is nonetheless always in a place, i.e., the place of the thing it is the matter of.
There is a way, however, to avoid this conclusion. Let us assume that what is not actually a substance is not actually the particular substance that is coming to be. For example, Socrates comes to be from what is not actually Socrates, e.g., the menses (τὰ καταµήνια), as Aristotle believes. Even so, it does not follow that at the time the change starts there is some unique and locatable entity that is potentially Socrates. So there is a
sense in which what is potentially Socrates is in no place. Or take the example of a house. At the time when a builder decides to make this house out of this matter, then this matter here is potentially this house. But this need not always be the case. Indeed it is more likely that the builder will decide to make a house from some matter or other and then choose which matter to use as the house is built. In this case, any wood available to the housebuilder as he builds is potentially part of the house. Now in the case of Socrates, the sperm (γονή) is not capable of deciding to make this embryo out of these menses here. It behaves like an 'automatic puppet' and works on whatever menses happens to be at hand (GA 2.1, 734b10 ff.). So any menses available to it is potentially 18 an embryo and there is no unique collection of menses at the time at which the change begins that has this status. Again, there is a sense in which what is potentially Socrates is in no place. It is nonetheless true, though, that the matter (which may be prime matter but need not be) that is potentially Socrates, though not all of it will end up being a part of what finally becomes Socrates in actuality, is part of a πρᾶγµα in which it and the substantial form of Socrates are separated.
That which is not accidentally becomes.
Before concluding my commentary on this section, I wish to address Aristotle's remark at 225a27-29 that that which is not accidentally becomes. In what sense does that which is not accidentally become? Aristotle's other mention of accidental change in this passage is clear enough. He says, 'that which is not white or not good' is accidentally in motion because 'that which is not white might be a man'. According to Posterior Analytics 1.4, a man is 'just what it is without being something else', but 'that which is not white' is not. 'That which is not white' is 'something different being [not] white', e.g., a man, which is intrinsically in motion (Post. An. 1.4, 73b6-9) . Since the man is accidentally 'that which is not white or not good' and the man is in motion intrinsically, 'that which is not white or not good' is in motion accidentally. Aristotle's claim that that which is not accidentally becomes, however, is about a substantial rather and a non-substantial change, and is not illustrated with an example. After having concluded that becoming cannot be a motion, because that which is not becomes, he continues, 'For however true it may be that it accidentally becomes, it is nevertheless correct to say that it is that which is not that becomes simpliciter' (225a27-29). Simplicius and Alexander think that 'that which is not' (ὸ µὴ ὄν) at 225a29 refers to prime matter, which they apparently identify with 'that which is not simpliciter' (τὸ µὴ ὄν ἁπλῶς), the terminus a quo of coming to be simpliciter in 7, 190b11-12) . When Socrates is gestating in his mother's womb, we say that Socrates is coming to be simpliciter (γίγνεται ἁπλῶς), and that the menses is coming to be Socrates. So why, then is Socrates accidentally coming to be? I suggest that while he is gestating, it is more proper to say that his parts are coming to be. So
Socrates is coming to be because his parts are coming to be, which Aristotle has identified at the beginning of the chapter as a type of accidental change (ἡ µεταβολὴ κατὰ µέρος, 224a24-6; b16-17, 23-4). The point of the passage, then, is that even though one can say that something is accidentally coming to be because its parts are coming to be, the thing that is coming to be nonetheless cannot be in motion because it simply does not exist until the end of the process.
The following passage from Physics 7 talks of material processes resulting in substantial coming to be and makes the point that these processes must have a subject that is different from the subject that is coming to be:
Moreover it would seem absurd actually to speak in this way, to speak, that is to say, of a man or house or anything else that has come into existence as having been altered. Though it may be true that every such becoming is necessarily the result of something's being altered, the result, e.g. of the matter's being condensed or rarefied or heated or cooled, nevertheless it is not the things that are coming into existence that are altered, and their becoming is not an alteration. (Phys. 7.3, 246a4-9) 16 This, of course, follows from the fact that these material processes culminate in the substance's existence. If a substance exists only at the end of these processes and not before, then the subject of the processes culminating in its existence must be something 20 other than the substance. Another passage from Physics 6 makes the same point, but with regard to substantial generations that are extended in time and continuous. If a substance is thought to emerge at the end of a continuous process of coming to be, the subject of that process prior to its completion must be something other than the substance that comes to be, e.g., one of its parts:
So it is evident also that that which has become must previously have been becoming, and that which is becoming must previously have become, everything (that is) that is divisible and continuous; though it is not always the actual thing that is becoming of which this is true: sometimes it is something else, that is to say, some part of the thing in question, e.g. the foundation-stone of a house.
(Phys. 6.6, 237b9-13)
Even though we describe the coming to be of a house as a single continuous, timeextended process, it actually consists and indeed must consist of a series of processes with subjects other than the house. Otherwise, the house would be undergoing a process before it exists. Since these different subjects will later be part of the house, the house is coming to be during this time, but since these subjects are only parts of the house, the house is only accidentally coming to be. The coming to be of the house, perhaps, supervenes on the coming to be of its parts.
225a34-b5:
Since, then, every motion is a kind of change, and there are only the three kinds of change mentioned above; and since of these three those which take the form of becoming and perishing, that is to say those which imply a relation of Now an affirmation signifies something about something, this last being either a name or a 'non-name'; and what is affirmed must be one thing about one thing.
(Names and 'non-names' have already been discussed. For I do not call 'not-man' a name but an indefinite name-for what it signifies is kind of (πως) one thing, but indefinite-just as I do not call 'does not recover' a verb). (De Int. 10, 19b5-10) In the passage he calls the subject a 'non-name', but a predicate adjective can be a 'non- Since what is signified by a negative predicate adjective is only 'kind of (πως) one thing', an affirmation using such an expression is only kind of (πως) an affirmation because what is affirmed in an unqualified affirmation 'must be one thing about one thing'. 'To affirm or deny one thing of many, or many of one,' says Aristotle, 'is not one affirmation or negation unless the many things together make up some one thing. I do not call them one if there exists one name but there is not some one thing they make up.' (De Int. 11, 20b12-15; cf. 8, 18a12-19). For example, if we predicate many characteristics that are essential to a certain type of subject like 'man', the many characteristics make up 'some one thing' that is predicated, but if we predicate many accidental characteristics of a given subject, even if we designate these characteristics by a single indefinite name, they make up something that is only kind of (πως) one. Hence the absurdity of supposing that there are Platonic Forms even of negations.
Returning to our passage, now, Aristotle's point is that at least some qualified affirmations can be rephrased as unqualified affirmations because the scope of the
